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Outsourcing Surveillance—Privatising 
Policy: Communications Regulation 
by Commercial Intermediaries  
ARNE HINTZ* 
The Snowden revelations of mass online surveillance have 
provided unprecedented information on state-based 
surveillance mechanisms. However they have also directed 
our attention to the role of commercial actors and private 
intermediaries. Commercial social media platforms are 
engaged in large-scale data collection and have been at the 
core of several NSA/GCHQ programmes—sometimes  
unknowingly, sometimes reluctantly, sometimes willingly. 
This article will discuss the role of private actors in 
surveillance strategies within the wider context of the 
privatisation of communication policy. It will demonstrate 
how intermediaries have not only been assigned a greater 
role in implementing laws and regulations, but have moved 
towards actively formulating and setting policy that deeply 
affects freedom of expression and data protection. I will 
discuss the implications for both legal and democratic 
processes, highlighting the problem of outsourcing control 
over key civic rights.  
I will situate this emerging authority of commercial actors in 
broader trends of communication policy that include 
networked multi-stakeholder processes, standard-setting by 
technical developers, and civil society practices of developing 
model laws and regulatory proposals as a form of ‘DIY 
policy-making’.   
                                            
* Cardiff University (email: hintza@cardiff.ac.uk). This article is based on research 
which is being conducted as part of the ESRC-funded project ‘Digital Citizenship 
and Surveillance Society: UK State-Media-Citizen Relations after the Snowden 
Leaks’ <http://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/dcssproject>. 
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Introduction 
The revelations by whistleblower Edward Snowden of mass online 
surveillance have provided unprecedented information on state-
based surveillance mechanisms. However, they have also directed 
our attention to broader trends in communications policy. At the 
core of several of the surveillance programmes by the NSA and 
GCHQ are commercial social media platforms that are engaged in 
large-scale data collection. Sometimes unknowingly, sometimes 
reluctantly, sometimes willingly, they have provided key 
infrastructure for monitoring and analysing citizens’ communication 
activities.  
Social media companies’ involvement in surveillance practices 
demonstrates how private intermediaries are increasingly enlisted in 
regulatory mechanisms and in the policing of online communication. 
Social media companies have restricted content that is published on 
or distributed through their platforms; resource and infrastructure 
providers have excluded clients (such as activist and oppositional 
information providers) from their services; and new intellectual 
property protection mechanisms have transferred the authority to 
define, detect and punish alleged copyright infringements to private 
actors (such as copyright holders and internet service 
providers). 
This article will discuss the role of private actors in surveillance and 
other current issues in digital communication, and thus explore the 
privatization of communications policy. It will trace how 
intermediaries have not only been assigned a greater role in 
implementing laws and regulations, but have moved towards actively 
formulating and setting policy. It will situate the emerging authority 
of these actors in the broader debate on freedom of expression on 
the internet and in current trends of policymaking, such as multi-
stakeholder policy processes, policy advocacy by both civil society 
and the private sector, and standard-setting by technical developers 
and infrastructure providers.  
I will first outline this context by pointing to different dimensions of 
networked governance. Then I will highlight key areas of the current 
debate around internet freedoms and restrictions, focusing on the 
three areas of surveillance, censorship and intellectual property. The 
third section will emphasize the role of commercial platforms and 
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private intermediaries in those areas, while the fourth section will 
trace and analyse resistance to and contestation of these trends. I will 
argue that the trend of outsourcing regulatory decisions and 
privatising policy has serious implications for freedom of expression 
and data protection, and that this trend is mirrored by contestations 
and resistance that take place, equally, in the arena of private, non-
state media actors and infrastructures. 
Communications Policy and Networked Governance 
Classic national lawmaking increasingly intersects with 
developments taking place at other levels and is subject to both 
normative and material influences by a variety of non-state actors. It 
has ‘become embedded within more expansive sets of interregional 
relations and networks of power’,1 and policy is now located at 
‘different and sometimes overlapping levels – from the local to the 
supra-national and global’.2 Policy fora such as the World Summit 
on the Information Society (WSIS) and the Internet Governance 
Forum have experimented with new forms of multi-stakeholder 
processes that include civil society and the business sector. The 
vertical, centralized and state-based modes of traditional regulation 
have thus been complemented by collaborative horizontal 
arrangements, leading to ‘a complex ecology of interdependent 
structures’ with ‘a vast array of formal and informal mechanisms 
working across a multiplicity of sites’.3 
Despite a lack of actual authority to adopt laws and regulations, 
non-state actors have been able to use this complex environment for 
                                            
1 David Held and Anthony G McGrew, ‘The Great Globalization Debate’ in David 
Held and Anthony G McGrew (eds), The Global Transformations Reader (Polity 
Press 2003) 3. 
2 Marc Raboy and Claudia Padovani, ‘Mapping Global Media Policy: Concepts, 
Frameworks, Methods’ (Global Media Policy, June 2010) 16 
<http://www.globalmediapolicy.net/sites/default/files/Raboy&Padovani%202010_l
ong%20version_final.pdf> accessed 2 December 2014. 
3 Marc Raboy, Global Media Policy in the New Millennium (University of Luton 
Press 2002) 6-7. 
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interventions into the ‘consensus mobilization’4 dynamics of policy 
debate. They define problems, set agendas, exert public pressure, 
sometimes through lobbying and public campaigns, sometimes by 
participating in multi-stakeholder policy development, and they hold 
significant leverage by lending or withdrawing legitimacy to policy 
goals, decisions and processes. 5  During ‘policy windows’, i.e. 
favourable institutional, political and sometimes ideological settings, 
such as economic crises and political change, they can affect policy 
change significantly.6  
In addition to normative interventions, civil society groups and the 
business sector have changed the communications environment by 
developing new technologies and platforms, and with them new 
standards, protocols and practices that became de facto cornerstones 
of communication technology. Technical communities have engaged 
in these forms of latent and invisible ‘policy-making’ during, for 
example, the development of the internet and its technical standards 
and protocols, from TCP/IP to http to jpeg. Each of these allows 
some actions and disallows others, enables some uses and restricts 
others, and therefore occupies quasi-policy functions (see, for 
example, Lessig,7 Braman,8 and DeNardis9). Media activists, equally, 
have focused on the creation of alternative infrastructure that 
bypasses regulatory obstacles instead of lobbying against those 
obstacles. Rather than campaigning for privacy rights and against 
online surveillance, many of them have developed communication 
platforms (e.g., specific email services, social media, etc.) that respect 
                                            
4 Sanjeev Khagram, James V Riker and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘From Santiago to Seattle: 
Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics’ in Sanjeev Khagram, 
James V Riker and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), Restructuring World Politics: 
Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms (University of Minnesota 
Press 2002) 11. 
5 Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics (Cornell University Press 1998). 
6 John W Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy (Little, Brown & Co 
1984). 
7 Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books 1999).  
8 Sandra Braman, Change of State: Information, Policy, and Power (MIT Press 
2006). 
9 Laura DeNardis, Protocol Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance 
(MIT Press 2009). 
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user privacy, and, rather than advocating for broadcast licences, 
many of them broadcast their own unlicensed ‘pirate’ radio. 
Interactions with the policy environment, in this case take place 
neither through lobbying ‘inside’ nor protesting ‘outside’ 
institutional or governmental processes, but through prefigurative 
action that creates alternative infrastructure and by adopting a 
tactical repertoire of circumvention.10 
Business actors have, for a long time, been engaged with these 
different forms of policy interventions. During the early development 
of international radio standards, for example, they drafted 
declarations that were later adopted by government representatives, 
and they shaped the radio as a unidirectional broadcast medium by 
pursuing certain avenues of technological development and 
neglecting others.11 They are heavily engaged with contemporary 
internet debates, from promoting certain standards and platforms 
(e.g. operating systems) to involvement with public campaigns (e.g. 
on intellectual property protection) and to intense lobbying (e.g. on 
net neutrality). 
Surveillance, Censorship, and Other Challenges to Digital 
Communication 
‘Governments of the Industrial World, leave us alone!’, John Perry 
Barlow proclaimed in his Declaration of the Independence of 
Cyberspace: ‘You have no sovereignty where we gather’. 12 
Cyberspace challenged the law’s traditional reliance on territorial 
borders and thus questioned governments’ ability to control citizens’ 
                                            
10 Arne Hintz and Stefania Milan, ‘At the Margins of Internet Governance: 
Grassroots Tech Groups and Communication Policy’ (2009) 5(1) International 
Journal of Media & Cultural Politics 23; Stephania Milan, Social Movements and 
their Technologies: Wiring Social Change (Palgrave MacMillan 2013). 
11 Cees J Hamelink, The Politics of World Communication: A Human Rights 
Perspective (Sage 1994). 
12 John Perry Barlow, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’ (8 
February 1996) <http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html> accessed 2 
December 2014. 
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behaviour.13 Anonymity was a possibility, if not the standard, of 
online communication, and as a famous New Yorker cartoon from 
1993 pointed out: ‘On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.’ 
The end-to-end principle of the internet gave maximum power and 
control to the edges of the network, i.e., to the user, rather than 
central nodes. The development of standards and protocols largely 
happened in a decentralized, informal and experimental fashion by 
technologists rather than governments and as ‘bottom-up, grassroots 
processes’, 14  ‘without a great deal of governmental or other 
oversight’.15 
However, states and larger business actors have gradually (re)gained 
influence over the new virtual landscapes, particularly since the turn 
of the millennium.16 In few areas has this change been as stark as in 
the practice of surveillance. In contrast to earlier celebrations (or 
concerns, depending on the perspective) of anonymity, electronic 
communication has vastly increased the capabilities of governments 
and corporate actors to monitor citizens’ interactions, exchanges, 
locations and movements. In contemporary ‘surveillance societies’, 
‘all manner of everyday activities are recorded, checked, traced and 
monitored’.17 As Sandra Braman notes, the traditional notion of 
panopticon-style surveillance has been replaced with the 
‘panspectron’, in which information is gathered about everything, all 
the time.18 
The revelations by whistleblower Edward Snowden about mass 
surveillance by security agencies such as the NSA and the GCHQ 
                                            
13 David R Johnson and David G Post, ‘Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace’ (1996) 48(5) Stanford Law Review 1367. 
14 Robert E Kahn, ‘Working Code and Rough Consensus: The Internet as Social 
Evolution’ in Don MacLean (ed), Internet Governance: A Grand Collaboration, 
(United Nations ICT Task Force 2004) 18. 
15 Vinton G Cerf, ‘First, Do No Harm’ in Don MacLean (ed), Internet Governance: 
A Grand Collaboration (United Nations ICT Task Force 2004) 14. 
16 Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a 
Borderless World (Oxford University Press 2006). 
17 David Lyon, ‘Surveillance, Power, and Everyday Life’ in Phillip Kalantzis-Cope 
and Karim Gherab-Martin (eds), Emerging Digital Spaces in Contemporary 
Society. Properties of Technology (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 7. 
18 Sandra Braman (n 8) 315. 
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have demonstrated this impressively. Programmes such as Prism, 
Tempora, Muscular, Edgehill, Bullrun and Quantumtheory have 
provided evidence of mass surveillance of social media users; 
interception and monitoring of most online and phone 
communication; state-sponsored hacking into telecommunications 
services; the sabotage of security tools; and the compromising of 
internet infrastructure. They have included paying security software 
firms to weaken the security of their products, and infecting citizens’ 
computers with malware to see their screen or use their webcam. 
The extent to which this has allowed states and corporate actors to 
collect, store and analyse data amounts to—in the words of 
Barlow—’monitoring the communication of the human race’.19  
National and international law has expanded governments’ ability to 
monitor citizens’ communication. For example the European Union 
Data Retention Directive, which was adopted in 2006 and 
implemented by most European countries in 2009 (but revoked by 
the European Court of Human Rights in 2014), required 
telecommunications operators and internet service providers to store 
their customers’ connection data and to make it available to the 
authorities upon request. This concerns detailed information on who 
communicates with whom, at what times, for how long, and at 
which physical location. According to civil rights lawyer T J 
McIntyre, the Directive resulted in the creation of ‘a comprehensive 
digital dossier about every individual’.20 In the wake of the Snowden 
revelations, states have replaced the Directive with national law and 
have expanded the legality of data collection further—for example, 
in the UK, through the controversial Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Act 2014. 
Blanket surveillance and pervasive monitoring of people’s 
movements, actions and communication undermine critical debate 
and dissident voices, and thus key features of a functioning 
democracy. Just a few days before the first Snowden leaks were 
                                            
19 Interview by Sky News with John Perry Barlow and Julian Assange (Sky News, 10 
June 2013) <www.youtube.com/watch?v=_DO8mdrPYWw> accessed 3 December 
2014. 
20 T J McIntyre, ‘Data Retention in Ireland: Privacy, Policy and Proportionality’ 
(2008) 24(4) Computer Law & Security Report 326, 327. 
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published in June 2013, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression and Opinion delivered a landmark report on 
state surveillance and freedom of expression in which he highlighted 
that the right to privacy is an essential requirement for the 
realization of the right to freedom of expression.21 Critical and 
investigative reporting is particularly challenged by surveillance, as it 
requires confidential communication with sources and, occasionally, 
the anonymity of authors.22 
A second area of significant change has been the drawing of 
territorial borders, and thus the (re)introduction of classic territorial 
law, in cyberspace. The ‘Great Firewall of China’ has demonstrated 
that control over major backbones and access points can allow 
governments to draw a virtual fence around a state territory and 
restrict access to both services and information from outside that 
territory.23 The Egyptian government, at the height of the Arab 
Spring uprising in January 2011, proved that internet access in a 
country can be reduced or even shut down during protest situations, 
and other governments have applied this new capability with 
increasing frequency and flexibility.24 Inside a country’s borders, 
filtering and blocking certain content has become common practice 
across the globe.25 Information that transcends moral, religious or 
political limits set by governments has been blocked, most 
                                            
21 UNGA, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Expression (Frank La Rue)’ (17 April 2013) UN Doc 
A/HRC/23/40. 
22 Alan Rusbridger, ‘David Miranda, Schedule 7, and the Danger that All Reporters 
Now Face’ (The Guardian, 19 August 2013) 
<www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/19/david-miranda-schedule7-
danger-reporters> accessed 3 December 2014. 
23 Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski and Jonathan Zittrain (eds), 
Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (MIT Press 
2008). 
24 Stephen C Webster, ‘Vodafone Confirms Role in Egypt’s Cellular, Internet 
Blackout’ (The Raw Story, 28 January 2011) 
<www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/01/28/vodafone-confirms-role-egypts-cellular-
internet-blackout/> accessed 3 December 2014. 
25 OpenNet Initiative, ‘Global Internet Filtering in 2012 at a Glance’ (OpenNet 
Initiative, 3 April 2012) <http://opennet.net/blog/2012/04/global-internet-filtering-
2012-glance> accessed 3 December 2014. 
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prominently in the Middle East and Asia, but increasingly also in 
Western countries. The UK has occupied a questionable pioneer role 
as internet service providers, mandated by the government, have 
established ‘Parental Control Filters’ that censor a range of different 
content types deemed inappropriate for minors.  
While child protection and the restriction of, for example, child 
pornography, may be admirable goals, the creation of an extensive 
censorship architecture for these purposes typically raises demands 
for wider content restrictions. As Ron Deibert notes, ‘once the tools 
of censorship are in place, the temptation for authorities to employ 
them for a wide range of purposes are large’.26 In Thailand, for 
example, the initial blocking of pornographic material was gradually 
extended to politically sensitive material. Some of the UK filters have 
included vague categories such as ‘extremist related content’ and 
‘esoteric material’ which are open for wide interpretation. The 
adoption of a child pornography filtering law in Germany in 2009 
was quickly followed by demands to extend the law to a broader 
range of content deemed illegitimate.27 But filtering can also lead to 
unintended over-blocking because of the imperfections or technical 
configuration of the software. An attempt by an internet service 
provider in Canada, for example, to block one site caused more than 
600 non–related websites to be blocked,28 and the child protection 
filters in the UK have blocked access to, for example, sexual 
education websites, parental guidance sites, the support site 
childline.org.uk, and the website of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, an important digital rights advocacy organization co-
founded by John Perry Barlow.29 
                                            
26 Ronald J Deibert, ‘The Geopolitics of Internet Control: Censorship, Sovereignty, 
and Cyberspace’ in Andrew Chadwick and Philip N Howard (eds), The Routledge 
Handbook of Internet Politics (Routledge 2009). 
27 Hintz and Milan, ‘At the Margins of Internet Governance’ (n 10). 
28 Nart Villeneuve, ‘The Filtering Matrix: Integrated Mechanisms of Information 
Control and the Demarcation of Borders in Cyberspace’ (2006) 11(1) First Monday 
<http://ojs-prod-lib.cc.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1307/1227> accessed 3 
December 2014.  
29 Martin Robbins, ‘Cameron’s Internet Filter Goes Far Beyond Porn—And That 
Was Always the Plan’ (New Statesman, 23 December 2013) 
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Content restrictions include the increasing criminalization of 
defamation online and tighter restrictions to speech that may include 
incitement. Many recent laws against the incitement to violence, 
crime and terrorism have been vague and open to subjective 
interpretations, which has led, for example in the UK, to a steep rise 
in prosecutions against bloggers and social media users for 
comments posted online. In some countries, special criminal 
sanctions have been introduced for online defamation.30 
A more indirect form of content restrictions has emerged with the 
debate on net neutrality. As a network of cables and wireless 
connections that move data packages from A to B regardless of their 
content, the internet has largely been a neutral platform for 
information exchange, rather than a broadcaster that makes editorial 
decisions. As such, it has become an important public sphere and a 
crucial space for free expression and democratic participation.31 
However the increasing practise by ISPs and telecommunications 
services of blocking and/or throttling (i.e. slowing down) some 
content, and speeding up the delivery of other content and services, 
has substantially altered this space. This form of content 
discrimination through infrastructure control provides particular 
challenges for non-commercial content and small businesses that 
may not be able to pay the fee required to be on a ‘fast lane’, and for 
oppositional and dissident news sources whose exposure a network 
provider may want to limit.32 
Finally, the increasingly rigid interpretation (and enforcement) of 
intellectual property has led to further restrictions. The free 
availability of protocols and standards has been essential for how we 
use the net today, and the hacker slogan ‘information wants to be 
                                                                                                   
<www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/12/camerons-internet-filter-goes-far-
beyond-porn-and-was-always-plan> accessed 3 December 2014. 
30 Article 19, ‘The Right to Blog: Article 19 Policy Brief’ (Article 19, 2013) 
<www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/3733/Right-to-Blog-EN-WEB.pdf> 
accessed 4 December 2014. 
31 Maria Loeblich and Francesca Musiani, ‘Net Neutrality and Communication 
Research: The Implications of Internet Infrastructure for the Public Sphere’ in Elisia 
L Cohen (ed), Communication Yearbook 38 (Routledge 2014).  
32 Jack M Balkin, ‘The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age’ (2009) 36(2) 
Pepperdine Law Review 427. 
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free’ has been a cornerstone for infrastructure development, the 
emergence of free and open source software, and aspects of digital 
culture such as remixes and mash-ups.33 The internet is a ‘gigantic, 
globally distributed, always-on copying machine’, 34  and a huge 
library that allows us to share files, share knowledge, and benefit 
from an abundance of ideas. However, control over these ideas and 
knowledge through the means of intellectual property has become a 
key economic resource and source of power and is therefore 
enforced fiercely. In what has been termed the ‘second enclosure’,35 
knowledge and information have been commodified and put under 
the control of the business sector. As scarcity—and thus a market—
is created for informational and immaterial goods, we have 
witnessed ‘the making of knowledge and information into 
property’. 36  The state has regulated and supported this process 
through the draconian punishment of intellectual property 
violations, 37  and multiple attempts to develop international 
agreements (such as ACTA).38 
Locations of Control: The Role of Private Intermediaries 
If we look a bit more closely at the three areas discussed above—
surveillance, content restrictions, and intellectual property 
enforcement—we can identify a shift in the location of policymaking 
and control. Starting again with the issue of surveillance, the crucial 
                                            
33 Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms 
Markets and Freedom (Yale University Press 2006); Lawrence Lessig, Remix: 
Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy (Bloomsbury 2008). 
34 Milton Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance 
(MIT Press 2010) 131. 
35 James Boyle, ‘The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain’ (2003) 66(1) Law and Contemporary Problems 33. 
36 Christopher May, ‘Globalizing the Logic of Openness: Open Source Software and 
the Global Governance of Intellectual Property’ in Andrew Chadwick and Philip N 
Howard (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics (Routledge 2009).  
37 See Robert Klotz, The Politics of Internet Communication (Rowman & Littlefield 
2004). 
38 Michael Geist, ‘The Trouble with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA)’ (2010) 30(2) SAIS Review 137. 
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role of internet companies in the monitoring of citizens and user 
behaviour was highlighted drastically in programmes such as Prism 
which were revealed by Edward Snowden. With their business 
models based on collecting and analysing user data, these companies 
have generated and stored detailed information about a growing 
number of people worldwide, including their locations, activities, 
preferences, friends and social networks, and sometimes political 
orientations. Unsurprisingly, Google, Facebook and others have been 
both at the centre of surveillance programmes such as Prism and in 
the spotlight of debate since the start of the revelations. While those 
arguing for the expansion of mass surveillance (such as the new 
Director of GCHQ, Robert Hannigan) have criticized internet 
companies for failing to address cybercrime and to allow 
governments to monitor their services,39 others have analysed the 
close and friendly relations between government and companies such 
as Google which suggest cooperative and supportive interactions 
between both forces.40 
Even before Snowden, reports such as the Google Transparency 
Report specified some of the more official ways in which 
governments use social media to collect information about its users. 
Between July and December 2013, Google received requests for the 
data of over 18,000 users in the US, and over 3,000 users in the UK 
(which is, in the case of the US, requests for 3,000 different users a 
month, or 100 different users each day).41  
Activists and dissidents that are targeted by governmental 
surveillance have experienced how their use of social media 
platforms and digital communication tools can put both their 
activities and their health and lives at risk. As one of the first so-
called ‘social media revolutions’, the ‘Green Revolution’ in Iran in 
2009 demonstrated how social media platforms like Twitter and 
                                            
39 Ben Quinn, James Ball and Dominic Rushe, ‘GCHQ Chief Accuses US Tech 
Giants of becoming Terrorists’ Networks of Choice’ (The Guardian, 3 November 
2014) <www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/03/privacy-gchq-spying-robert-
hannigan> accessed 3 December 2014. 
40 Julian Assange, When Google Met WikiLeaks (OR Books 2014) 
41 Google, ‘Transparency Report 2014’ (Google, 2014) 
<www.google.co.uk/transparencyreport> accessed 3 December 2014. 
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YouTube could help mobilize the public and spread information 
internationally, but also serve as a means to identify protesters. As 
Hofheinz notes: ‘While people in New York cafés were forwarding 
tweets that gave them the thrilled feeling of partaking in a revolution, 
Iranian conservatives tightened their grip on power using YouTube 
videos and other Internet evidence to identify and arrest opposition 
activists’.42 In Iran, Tunisia and elsewhere, authorities used Facebook 
to scrape user data. In Syria, opposition supporters that used social 
media were targeted through malware that installed spying software 
onto the infected computer, for example to capture webcam activity, 
and stole YouTube and Facebook login credentials.43 State reactions 
to the London riots in the UK in August 2011 mirrored some of 
these responses as protesters were identified through their use of 
social networking, and merely communicating about the riots on 
social media led to severe punishment, including prison sentences.44 
As the collection and storage of data is outsourced to social media 
companies, telecommunications services and ISPs, so is the targeted 
intrusion, monitoring and analysis of user data. Companies such as 
Finfisher and Blue Coat provide sophisticated tools for surveillance 
and filtering to governments around the world, including both 
Western democracies and authoritarian states.45 
While the surveillance theme points to the use of intermediaries by 
the state, the second area—content restrictions—unveils more direct 
                                            
42 Albrecht Hofheinz, ‘Nextopia? Beyond Revolution 2.0’ (2011) 5 International 
Journal of Communication 1417, 1420.  
43 Nart Villeneuve, ‘Fake Skype Encryption Software Cloaks DarkComet Trojan’ 
(Trend Micro Malware Blog, 20 April 2012) <http://blog.trendmicro.com/fake-
skype-encryption-software-cloaks-darkcomet-trojan/> accessed 3 December 2014. 
44 Owen Bowcott, Helen Carter and Helen Clifton, ‘Facebook Riot Calls Earn Men 
Four-Year Jail Terms amid Sentencing Outcry’ (The Guardian, 16 August 2011) 
<www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/16/facebook-riot-calls-men-jailed> accessed 3 
December 2014. 
45 Morgan Marquis-Boire and others, ‘Planet Blue Coat: Mapping Global 
Censorship and Surveillance Tools’ (The Citizen Lab, January 2013) 
<https://citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Planet-Blue-Coat.pdf> accessed 
3 December 2014; Morgan Marquis-Boire and others, ‘For Their Eyes Only: The 
Commercialisation of Digital Spying’ (The Citizen Lab, 2013) 
<https://citizenlab.org/storage/finfisher/final/fortheireyesonly.pdf> accessed 3 
December 2014. 
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interventions by the private sector. Beyond the classic forms of state-
sanctioned censorship and law-based content limitations, app stores 
and social media platforms have created their own rules and 
practices for accepting and rejecting content. Apple, for example, 
deleted an app from its app store that marked US drone strikes on a 
geographic map. The app was not illegal but certainly politically 
sensitive.46 Facebook has taken down activist pages in the run-up to 
protest events as well as dissident pages such as ‘Anarchist Memes’, 
a page dedicated to anti-capitalist, anti-racist and feminist rights, ‘as 
part of a growing effort by Facebook to crack down on the presence 
of political groups on its network’.47 It has also censored cartoons 
and other content, such as pictures of breastfeeding mothers because 
of alleged ‘indecency’.48 The company thereby makes decisions with 
severe political and human rights implications. It has thus become a 
‘social media police force’49 that is bound by its own terms of service, 
cultural background and political leanings, rather than the rule of 
law. It has joined other intermediaries such as ISPs and search 
engines as ‘proxy censors’.50 
Such intermediaries also encompass providers of other relevant 
infrastructure, including server space, domain registration, and 
funding. In December 2010, Amazon, PayPal and others 
demonstrated their crucial gatekeeping role when they closed the 
services they had previously provided for WikiLeaks, depriving the 
leaks platform of its domain name and of access to necessary funds 
in the middle of a major release (the Cablegate leaks). This ‘denial of 
                                            
46 Christina Bonnington and Spencer Ackerman, ‘Apple Rejects App that Tracks 
U.S. Drone Strikes’ (Wired, 30 August 2012) <www.wired.com/2012/08/drone-
app> accessed 3 December 2014. 
47 Lina Dencik, ‘Why Facebook Censorship Matters’ (JOMEC Blog, 13 January 
2014) <www.jomec.co.uk/blog/why-facebook-censorship-matters> accessed 3 
December 2014. 
48 Ben Norton, ‘Fascist Facebook? The Social Network Giant’s Double Standards’ 
(Counterpunch, 10 January 2014) <www.counterpunch.org/2014/01/10/fascist-
facebook> accessed 3 December 2104. 
49 Dencik (n 47). 
50 Seth F Kreimer, ‘Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet 
Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link’ (2006) 155(11) University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 11, 13. 
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service’51 propelled the providers of critical services into the spotlight 
of the debate around WikiLeaks and freedom of expression. It 
demonstrated the significant power of so-called ‘cloud’ services in 
allowing and disallowing access to information and in controlling 
the gates that enable internet users to participate in increasingly 
cloud-based communication exchanges. Further, the actions by 
Amazon, PayPal, etc., highlighted the vulnerability of these services 
to political interventions, as they coincided with pressure from 
members of the US political elite, both inside and outside 
government.52  
Finally, the fight against filesharing and remixing offers particularly 
useful insights into the outsourcing of policy. The typical chain of 
action would see a property owner or their representative, such as 
the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), commission 
a law firm as an intermediary which would then contact the ISP or 
content provider and request the latter to take down particular 
content or a link. Such interactions between private firms have led to 
requests to remove, on average, 20-25 million URLs from Google 
searches each month, by summer 2014.53 Similarly, the US Copyright 
Alert System was established in 2013 as an agreement between the 
copyright holder industry and ISPs in which copyright holders 
identify shared copyrighted material and ISPs exert punishment by 
warning the respective customer or, as a last resort, cancelling their 
internet connection. The mechanism bypasses governmental and 
judicial oversight and puts both the definition of, and the 
punishment for, copyright infringement in the hands of content 
owners and ISPs.54 According to Mueller, ‘the regulatory trend that 
constantly emerges from the [intellectual property] tension is a shift 
of the responsibility for monitoring and policing Internet conduct 
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onto strategically positioned private sector intermediaries’. 55  By 
delegating responsibility to the private sector, the state enlists 
businesses and other non-state actors in implementing 
communications policy and, furthermore, transfers quasi-policy 
functions.  
Opposing Internet Restrictions and Surveillance 
The trend towards the limitation of internet freedoms and to 
pervasive surveillance is heavily contested and has led to growing 
campaigns for digital rights as well as protests against restrictive 
internet policies. The surveillance scandal revealed by Edward 
Snowden has triggered street protests and international campaigns 
such as ‘Stop Watching Us’.56 Protests have been complemented by 
other campaign strategies, e.g. petitions57 and litigation.58 That such 
mobilizations can have significant success was demonstrated earlier 
by the protests against the ‘Stop Online Piracy Act’ (SOPA), a US bill 
to combat online copyright infringement. A ‘transnational coalition 
of engineers, academics, hackers, technology companies, bloggers, 
consumers, activists, and Internet users’59 managed to defeat the bill 
in a ‘David and Goliath story in which relatively weak activists were 
able to achieve surprising success against the strong’. 60  Larger 
organizations that advocate for digital rights, such as the Association 
for Progressive Communications (APC), have brought their concerns 
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to debates at international institutions and have participated in 
multi-stakeholder fora such as the Internet Governance Forum and 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. 
Yet these strategies have been complemented by other forms of 
intervention, such as the development of technological alternatives 
and encryption tools, and by changes in individual communication 
practises. Responses to the surveillance scandal have included the 
increased use of anonymization tools, such as PGP and TOR, and 
their promotion through ‘Cryptoparties’. Non-profit activist-based 
internet services such as Riseup.net have offered secure email 
accounts, mailing lists and online spaces such as blog and pad 
platforms, and have collaborated with similar groups across the 
globe to create networks of activist communication that are less 
prone to censorship and surveillance. Efforts to create alternative 
forms of social networking, such as Lorea.org, have added to a 
strategy that focuses on the development of autonomous and civil 
society-based media infrastructure. This approach is informed by the 
individualism of cyberpolitics which emphasizes the right of the 
individual to explore all information in cyberspace—unimpeded and 
uncensored—and to contribute and share knowledge.61 It also draws 
from the rather loose and often temporary forms of association and 
‘connective action’62 that online activists and other ‘netizens’ have 
developed and experimented with, and that have moved beyond 
established formats such as unions, parties, and formal civil society 
organizations.  
Rather than advocating for policy change, many internet activists 
thus see their job as creating ‘self-managed infrastructures that work 
regardless of “their” regulation, laws or any other form of 
governance’.63 They operate ‘beyond’ the classic divisions of social 
movement activism in ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ approaches, i.e. in 
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collaborative and participatory advocacy versus protest and 
disruption. Instead, they build alternatives to existing 
communication infrastructure and seek to bypass laws and policy 
obstacles. Their strategies focus on prefigurative action, rather than 
attempts to influence policy processes they regard as dominated by 
existing powers.64 In their efforts, they thus mirror privatized forms 
of policy authority and implementation as they trust in their own 
ability to develop solutions to perceived problems, rather than in the 
abilities of public institutions. 
At the intersection of policy advocacy and prefigurative action, new 
strategies of grassroots do-it-yourself policy-making and ‘policy 
hacking’ are emerging that focus on developing new model laws and 
regulatory proposals, rather than merely advocating for them. Often 
this has involved digital tools to crowd-source contributions from a 
wider range of civil society. Policy hacking and DIY policy-making 
has extended from the local level (e.g. the making of a new 
transparency law in the city of Hamburg in 2012) to the national 
(e.g. the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative which created proposals 
for new media laws in Iceland) to the international (e.g. the 
development of a model law on net neutrality at the Internet 
Governance Forum).65 Here, the ‘outsourcing’ of policy-making has 
involved civil society actors who have taken legislative development 
into their own hands. 
Conclusion 
Internet policy in the (not anymore so) new millennium has changed 
as both the private and state sectors have strengthened their grip on 
technical infrastructure and its uses. The deterritorialized spheres of 
the internet have partly been reterritorialized by states; the practice 
of filtering and blocking content is expanding; information and ideas 
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are being commodified; and digital surveillance has become 
pervasive. Thus the ‘policies of liberation’ which early cyberspace 
and cyberlaw thinkers had envisioned are giving way to ‘policies of 
control’.66  
However we can observe another trend which intersects with this 
development—the privatization of internet policy. Commercial 
intermediaries are enlisted to police the net and develop new rules 
for allowing as well as restricting communication practices and 
freedom of expression. They are required by governments to monitor 
their users and store data exchanges, but they also collaborate to 
define and punish objectionable user behaviour, and they implement 
their own rules to provide, and withdraw, vital spaces and resources 
for communication. Responsibility and authority for policy-making 
and implementation are thus shifting to the private sector in the 
shape of ISPs, telecommunications services, social media platforms 
and other providers of online services. 
Resistance to problematic policies and practices that are 
implemented in this way—from surveillance to content restrictions—
is equally transitioning from a state focus to prefigurative action by 
civil society groups. Established forms of advocacy and campaigning 
are complemented with the development of alternative platforms, 
tools for circumvention, and model laws and regulations. Demands 
for privacy, free expression, an open internet and unrestricted 
exchange of knowledge are thus not just raised through protest and 
lobbying but through the self-organized creation of technological as 
well as policy alternatives that embody and implement these values. 
The contestations over current issues such as surveillance take place 
increasingly in the arena of private, non-state media actors and 
infrastructures.  
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